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THE PINBALL PROBLEM IN ILLINOIS-AN OVERDUE SOLUTION
RUFUS KING
Mr. King is a member of the New York, Maryland and District of Columbia bars, practices in
the District of Columbia and has been variously identified with criminal law and law enforcement-
particularly in the field of gambling-since his service as legislative counsel to the Kefauver Com-
mittee in 1951. He has contributed numerous articles to leading law publications, including this
Journal. See King, The Rise and Decline Of Coin-Machine Gambling, 55 J. CPni. L., C. & P.S. 199
(1964).
The following article was written by Mr. King, at the invitation of the Journal editors, in response
to the article published in the last issue, Bilek and Ganz, The Pinball Problem-Alternative Solutions,
56 .. Caim. L., C. & P.S. 432(1965). In his article, Mr. King disputes the conclusions of the Bilek
and Ganz article that gambling and amusement pinball devices are indistinguishable and that total
prohibition of all such machines is the only effective way to curb their potential use for gambling,
and traces recent legislative and judicial history in Illinois as illustrative of the difficulties encoun-
tered in dealing with the pinball problem.
In a recent issue of this Journal' two officials of
Cook County2 propound universal solutions for the
"pinball problem" in three alternative draft
statutes, one wiping out the industry altogether,
one consisting of some three thousand words of
fine print about licensing and inspection, and the
third being a do-it-yourself revision of the second.
All prior legislative drafting attempts in this
area, the authors say, have failed. All regulatory
measures aimed at letting the industry survive
without their proposed inspectional provisions
are, they conclude, doomed to failure.
Total prohibition of all pinball games appeals to
these authors most because (1) it makes the legis-
lative drafting "very simple," (2) it would impose
"almost no burden" on the police, (3) it would only
ruin those connected with the industry (unless
they find something else to manufacture and sell)-
and that, after all, is a disadvantage "almost en-
tirely economic," and (4) nobody but "certain
segments of our society" would be thereby de-
prived of any possible amusement benefits.
Let it be conceded at the outset that there is a
"pinball problem" and that it is an aggravated
problem in Illinois. Illinois is one of the last juris-
dictions where gambling pinballs, successors to
I Bilek and Ganz, The Pinball Problem-Alterna-
tive Solutions, 56 J. Crnt. L., C. & P.S. 432 (1965).
2 Arthur J. Bilek is Chief of the Cook County (Chi-
cago), Illinois Sheriff's Police Department; Alan S.
Ganz served as Assistant State's Attorney from 1959
to 1961, and is now engaged in the private practice of
law in Chicago.
3 King, The Rise and Decline of Coin Machine Gam-
bling, 55 J. CRns. L., C. & P.S. 199, 201-3 (1964).
the 'one-armed bandit,3 still flourish openly.4
Cook County is one of the few metropolitan areas
that has not done anything-at least not anything
effective-about them.' Let it be conceded also
that the makers of amtusement pinball games and
those who distribute and operate them do not
claim to benefit society on any gigantic scale;
they merely provide, for a pittance, a few moments'
spritely entertainment to those who patronize
their machines-though in truth the products of
this amusement industry look pretty good in the
company of those who fill the airwaves with bland
idiocy, purvey smut and trash to the quasi-
literate, grind out C-minus titillation for the screen,
and drench the American public with toxic sub-
stances like nicotine and ethyl alcohol.
If my readers hold the article I am discussing
beside this one and expect an error-by-error refu-
tation, they must face disappointment. If I under-
4 Among these, Nevada alone is wholly saturated
with coin-operated gaming; other states with more-or-
less localized gambling pinball operations (and where
the flourishing is more-or-less "open") are Maryland,
Kentucky, Washington, Oregon, Louisiana, South
Carolina and Tennessee-nearly all with long stories
comparable to the one being unfolded here. See, e.g.,
King, supra, note 3, at 200, ftn. 10, and note 32 infra.
5 Late in November, 1965, at the instigation of the
Sheriff, the Board of Commissioners of Cook County
passed a total-prohibition ordinance based on the City
of Chicago's-whereupon no less an authority than
co-author Bilek announced publicly that he knew of
167 "gamnbling type" pinball machines being operated
in Cook County suburbs. Chicago Tribune, Novem-
ber 24, 1965. A campaign is now being carried on by the
Sheriff's office to induce other incorporated munici-
palities to follow Cook County's lead.
RUFUS KING
took that, we would get only as far as the eighth
word in the first line (pinball machines are not
electronic, they are electro-mechanical), and prog-
ress thereafter would at at a similar pace. Instead I
shall try to dispel the Alice-in-Wonderland at-
mosphere these authors have created 6 -of indis-
tinguishable "machinery shells," and "honest
lessors ' 7 dealing with "crooked lessees," and
searches a la Henry v. United States5 within the
confines of a pinball light box-by describing
briefly some of the controlling realities in this
field.
First, all United States pinball machines are
produced in the Chicago area, in Cook County,
by a handful of manufacturers who make no secret
of what they put into their products.
Second, one type of machine, produced by one
company, is designed and manufactured for gam-
bling operations, and despite protestations to the
contrary, for nothing else.9
6 "Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatchl"
'Ironically, if there is any significant tie between
gambling pinball machines and organized crime [Cf.,
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Prohibiting the Transportation of Gambling Denices in
Interstate Commerce, H. Rep. No. 1828, 87th Cong.,
p. 16 (June, 1962)1 it is at the level of the operator,
i.e., the Bilek-Ganz "lessor" [See, e.g., Senate Select
Comm. on Improper Activities in the Labor Manage-
ment Field, Investigations, etc., Hearings, Part 47
(1959)]. The operator, not the location owner, is the
organizer and promoter of gambling on the local scene,
the putative briber of officials, and the man whose
"territory" may be extended and protected by "mus-
cle." Yet Bilek and Ganz are touchingly solicitous
about him: "The honest lessor saddled with a crooked
lessee needs to be protected." (Bilek and Ganz, supra
note 1 at 438.) Their weird revocation-of-consent pro-
cedure (Id., pp. 438-9, 444), seemingly unprecedented
in gambling-law draftsmanship, would let the operator
elect whether he wanted his machines destroyed in the
event they were seized, or whether he wanted to put
them away until the "heat was off." Cf., MODEL ANTI-
Ggkmla2No AcT (Nat'l. Conf. of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 1952).
8361 U. S. 98 (1959), where FBI agents, stalking
Henry for possessing stolen whisky, learned after they
arrested him that what he really possessed was radios,
and discovered some hours after that that the radios
were stolen. If the selection of this authority reflects
careful scholarship by Bilek and Ganz, it does indeed
illuminate their understanding of the "pinball prob-
lem," for the controlling fact was that the agents made
their observations "from a distance of some 300 feet"
and could not determine anything about the size,
number or contents of the cartons containing the radios.
361 U. S. 98, 99. For a recent and faultless application
of the law of seizure in a gambling device (punch board)
case, see People v. McDonald, 26 Ill. 2d 325, 186 N. E.
2d 303, (1962).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Korpan, 354 U. S. 271
Third, all other pinball machines now marketed
by the industry are machines of types designed
and manufactured merely to vend amusement,
are incapable of being used to promote gam-
bling,10 and have never been (in thirty years' ex-
perience with them) so used.'
Fourth, to convert an amusement pinball game
into a gambling device is only possible in the sense
that one could rebuild a moppet sports car into a
ten-ton truck (and no such makeshift conversion
has ever been encountered in the entire history of
the industry) .
2
Fifth, a blind child could tell any gambling
pinball machine now in common use unerringly
from any contemporary amusement type by
touch and sound alone-binocular federal agents
3
and the normally endowed lawmakers and en-
(1957); Singleton v. Mathis, 284 F. 2d 616 (8th Cir.
1960); United States v. Two Coin-Operated Pinball
Machines, 241 F. Supp. 57 (W. D. Ky., 1964); United
States v. One Bally "Barrel-O-Fun" Coin Operated
Gambling Device, 224 F. Supp. 794 (M. D. Pa., 1963);
United States v. Nine Gambling Devices, 59-2 USTC
15,257 (S. D. Ill., 1957); In re Three Pinball Machines,
120 Pa. Super. 28, 192 A. 2d 240 (1963); State v. Bally
Beach Club Pinball Machine, 119 A. 2d 876 (Vt.,
1956).
10 Though they can, of course, be used for bets among
players, competing in this sense with the U. S. Mint
and the service it has long rendered to coin-flippers,
coin-matchers, and coin-tossers. See, Johnson v. Phin-
ney, 218 F. 2d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 1955). In one Cook
County suburb (Skokie) amusement pinballs are cur-
rently the subject of a hue-and-cry on the testimony
of a 15-year-old housebreaker whose confession was
revealed (and quoted) to the press as follows: "85
per cent of [the loot] 'I fed into pinball machines. I
know guys that go into their mothers' purses and take
money for use in pinball machines,' the boy told police.
'These machines are often used for gambling, too. By
gambling, I mean two boys play for a penny a point,
so that if one person wins by 1,500 points, he wins by
$15." Chicago Sun Times, November 26, 1965. Cf.
note 6 supra.
1 Though amusement games have sometimes been
held to violate gambling laws in the confusion that arose
in the 'thirties over the value of free games, as ex-
plained further in the text, infra at note 29. See Annot.,
148 A.L.R. 879 (1944) and 89 A.L.R. 2d 815 (1963).
12 The current "bingo" gambling machines, for ex-
ample, contain approximately 7,000 feet of wiring,
weigh around 400 pounds, and cost about S1300; the
circuits of a typical single-player amusement game are
carried by 800 feet of wire, the game weighs around
300 pounds, and its cost is in the $450 range. (On one
point accuracy may be conceded to Bilek and Ganz:
their prices are right).
13 The I.R.S. since 1941 under the gaming device
stamp tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
(26 U.S.C. 4461-2), and the FBI since enactment of
the federal Gambling Devices Act of 1962 (15 U.S.C.
1171 ff.). See, e.g., T. Reg. 45.4462-1(b)(2), Rev. Ruls.
59-294, 60-102 and 61-28, and the federal cases col-
lected at note 9 supra.
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forcement agencies of most states14 have been
making this distinction successfully for years.
So the trouble-the "pinball problem"-is not
in the physical features of the machines at all.
The trouble springs from the often confused, and
sometimes conceivably cynically colored, argu-
ments that have raged around the application of
old-fashioned gambling laws to these relative
newcomers in the coin-machine field. And that
leads us back to the story of Illinois and its great
urban county on the windy lakeshore. 5
Coin-operated pinball games were first built in
Chicago in the early depression days. Based on the
Victorian parlor game of bagatelle, the first
models gave seven balls for a penny, allowing the
player to shoot onto an inclined plane with num-
bered receptacles (literally outlined with nails or
"pins"). This game (the first ones cost less than
$20.00) caught the public fancy, along with midget
golf, flagpole sitting, dance marathons and jigsaw
puzzles.
While the new pinball industry thus thrived
modestly, advancing into table models, elec-
trically illuminated backboards, and greater
complexity of play, the old slot machine manu-
facturers (also centered in Chicago) were falling
upon harder and harder times. Despite the in-
genuity of slot-machine designers, anything that
applied pure chance for a wagered coin and paid
out in cash or redeemable tokens was apt to be
quickly pounced upon by local enforcement officers
with an eye on the classic elements of gambling-
consideration, chance and prize.
16
In this era even some pinball games reached the
market with coin-spewing cash payout adapta-
tions. But they did not last long, for no court has
ever been fully persuaded that the gravity-
motivated descent of metal balls on a glass-covered
inclined plane is devoid of chance (so, patently,
14 Excluding the eight states named in note 4 supra,
and of course Illinois, about three-fourths of the rest
(i.e., about 30) allow amusement pinball games with-
out tolerating the gamblers. The remainder still have
statutes or court rulings aimed variously at the free
game per se, with the resulting confusion in enforcement
explained further in the text, infra at note 29. See
e.g., N. Y. PENAL CODE, §982.
15 Where, I am constrained to add as a further
riposte, a different "physical feature" has demon-
strably sometimes played a part: official eyes that will
not see.
"Homer v. United States, 147 U . 449 461 ff.
(1893); Chambers v. Bachtel, 55 F. 2d 851 (5th Cir.
1932); Boynton v. Ellis, 57 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1932);
Boosalis v. Crawford 99 F. 2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
See, King, supra, note 3, at 199-201.
they incorporated the three elements of gambling
in proscribed combination). 17
However, in 1935 a Chicago pinball company
came up with an amsement feature that opened
new vistas for everyone. By.a simple adaptation
of the coin chute, 8 a player who made a sufficient
score could be allowed to set up another game
without inserting another coin; by a further adap-
tation, high scores could be rewarded with even
more free replays-any number, in fact. Here was
something that added play incentive in the amuse-
ment models so their popularity zoomed; by luck
and skill19 a player could extend the amusement he
had purchased so he could actually go on playing,
another game or a few more games, 20 at no addi-
tional cost. And note that this offends no tradi-
tional notion of gambling. When the player fin-
ishes, he is not enriched by a prize or pay-off.
When he leaves the machine he has received what
he bought, the amusement inherent in the play
and nothing else (comparably, bowling sometimes
gives an extra frame, baseball may provide some
extra-innings, a, golfer's nine includes an indeteK-
minate number of strokes, etc.).9
But the Chicago gambling manufacturers
found a way to make use of the free game device
too. On their machines (including even converted
one-armed bandits) the player could win large
multiples of free games.22 If the sheriff came
around, the player could stand there and play
17 See, Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F. 2d 303 (5th Cir,
1955); U. S. v 19 Automatic Pay Off Pinball Machines,
113 F. Supp. 230 (W. D. La., 1953).
1I See, Chicago Patent Corp. v. Genco, Inc., 124
F. 2d 725 (7th Cir. 1941).19 In the early 'fifties the amasement industry added"fRippers"-small pushbutton-controlled strikers on
each side of the board to allow the player to prolong
the play of each ball. These are now as characteristic
of amusement games as the puck to hockey or the
driver to golf. They would never be found on a gam-
bling machine, where the aim is to get the subterfuge
pinball play over as quickly as possible, unless the
gambling designers someday adopt them for protective
coloration.
21 Amusement machines will award a maximum of
two or three free replays in one game, and usually are
built to accumulate 26 (which operators generally
stop down to 10 or 15).
21 See, Moore J., dissenting in State ex rel. Harmon
v. Doe, 255 Ia. 814, 123 N. W. 2d 400 (1963); State
v. Fitzpatrick,,407 P. 2d 309 (Idaho, 1965).
22 Current "bingo" models offer up to 600 on one
play and accumulate up to 999-imperatively neces-
sary, incidentally, to provide what gamblers call the
"big lick." The lure of every successful gambling pro-
motion is the chance of a long-shot win, e.g., the tradi-
tional "jackpot" of the one-armed bandit. Discovering
this feature on the backboard of a gambling pinball
machine (cf. note 20 supra) can scarcely be charac-
terized as much of a visual feat.
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them off-by the hundreds and by the hour if
necessary.n But when the sheriff was not there,
the location owner, partner in the operation with
the machine owner, redeemed the games in cash,
cleared the redeemed games from the machine by a
circuit built into it for that purpose (which also
recorded the number of games so cleared), and
was later accurately reimbursed out of the proceeds
when the owner opened the cash box and before
the two divided the net profits.
The evolution of the gambling pinball machine,
from "one-balls" to current "bingo" models,
and other characteristic gambling features-the
multiple coin adaptation, the "reflex unit," the
simplified pinball action, etc.-have been copiously
described elsewhere. But it was above all this free-
game-payout subterfuge that started two lines of
pin-ball machines flowing out of the Chicago
manufactories, gambling and amusement versions
sometimes even coming alternately from the same
plant. And it was this clear dichotomy that caused
the industry to split bitterly in the mid-forties,
with one segment striving to make a place for it-
self among legitimate coin vendors while the other
(now a single company) continues to market in-
creasingly sophisticated gambling models.2
In 1895 the Illinois General Assembly made
mechanical gambling devices contraband per se,
in the following language:
Every clock, tape machine, slot machine or
other machine or device for the reception of
money on chance or upon the actions of which
money is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost
is hereby declared a gambling device and shall
be subject to seizure, confiscation and destruc-
tion by any municipal or other local authority
within whose jurisdiction the same may be
found.
25
If this law embarrassed any of the manufacturers
during the half-century heyday of the slot ma-
chine, when Chicago companies virtually monop-
olized production for the nation, there is no easily
discoverable record of it. Apparently such ma-
2The Court in Turner v. United States, 62-1
USTC 15,402 (D. Kan., 1962) observed that it
would take 33 hours and 18 minutes to play 999 games
-by a player who was lucky (?) enough not to win
any more replays in the process.
24The Dec. 4, 1965, issue of the trade magazine
BmLBoARn announces (p. 62) the marketing of "a new
bingo-style game" sub nomine Folies Bergeres, which
reportedly "has several mechanical refinements" but
nonetheless "incorporates all features of former game
Beauty Beach."
25 Laws, 1895, p. 156, §1.
chines, destined each year by the tens of thousands
to other jurisdictions, were never "found" on
loading docks by any "municipal or other local
authority" of Cook County. [Parenthetically,
a Cook County State's Attorney did come alive in
1958, but he elected to enforce a World War I
statute prohibiting possession of slot machines in
any county having a military installation "of the
first class," and his seizures were knocked out
because no one could say what had been meant by
"first class." Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Adamowski,
22 Ill. 2d 36, 174 N. E. 2d 200 (1961)26].
Slot machines operated in the state fared less
well.n And in 1942, pinball machines-of both
the amusement and gambling varieties-ran into
trouble. In that year the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that under the 1895 statute a pinball game
merely awarding free replays (i.e., whether it con-
tained the pay-off subterfuge features or not) was a
gambling device per se. People v. One Pinball
Machine, 316 II. App. 161, 44 N. E. 2d 139.2
In reaching this result the court followed a then-
prevalent line of reasoning, manifestly aimed at
the gambling machines, that a free replay has the
monetary value of its original counterpart, and
should therefore be regarded as the equivalent of a
cash prize.u
26 A notable dissent was filed by justices Hershey,
Schaefer and Solfisburg, 174 N. E. 2d 200, 204.2 Bobel v. People, 173 Ill. 19, 50 N. E. 322 (1898);
Guarnera v. County of Lee, 285 Ill. App. 238, 1 N. E.
2d 98 (1936); Germania Club v. Chicago, 32 Il.
App. 122, 74 N. E. 2d 29 (1947); People v. One Slot
Machine, etc., 344 Ill. App. 379, 100 N. E. 2d 788
(1951).
"Petition for leave to appeal denied, 321 Ill. App.
XIII.
9E. g., Middlemas v. Strutz, 71 N. D. 186, 299
N. W. 589 (1941); Giomi v. Chase, 97 N. M. 22, 132
P. 2d 715 (1942); Steely v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
554, 164 S. W. 2d 977 (1942). This free-game-equals-
prize rationale has a few contemporary adherents even
among courts whose opinions make it clear they fully
understand the real gambling problem, e. g., State ex
rel. Harmon v. Doe and State v. Fitzpatrick, supra,
note 21 [refusing to overturn, respectively, State v.
Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 3 N. W. 2d 620 (1942) and Tha-
mart v. Moline, 66 Idaho 110, 156 P. 2d 187 (1945)),
and State v. Pinball Machines, 404 P. 2d 923 (Alaska
Supreme Court No. 529, decided Aug. 19, 1965); Farina
v. Kelly, 147 Conn. 444, 162 A. 2d 517 (1960). A
stronger and clearer line of authority has developed
(and generally law-enforcement policies have tended
to be less confused) where the free game per se is
accurately acknowledged as an amusement feature,
e.g., Washington Coin Machine Ass'n v. Callahan,
142 F. 2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1945), Gayer v. Whelan, 59
Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P. 2d 763 (1943), State v. Waite,
156 Kan. 143, 131 P. 2d 708 (1942), McNeice v.
Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 142, 84 N. W. 2d 232 (1957),
and Peachey v. Boswell, 240 Ind. 604, 167 N. E. 2d
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So the Illinois pinball market remained more or
less closed, at least, officially, for several years
after World War H-though nobody bothered the
Chicago manufacturers when they pulled down
their war-production "E's" and resumed the
building of pinball machines in both categories
for shipment out of the state.
Then in 1953 the Illinois General Assembly
amended the 1895 Act. This body keeps no journals
from which legislative history and legislative
intent can be ascertained," but it is commonly
understood that the lawmakers thought they were
reopening the state to amusement games. The
amendment was this:
A coin-in-the-slot-operated mechanical device
played for amusement which rewards the
player with the right to replay such mechan-
ical device, which device is so constructed or
devised as to make such result of the opera-
tion thereof depend in part upon the skill of
the player and which returns to the player
thereof no coins, tokens or merchandise
shall not be considered to be a gambling
device within the meaning of this Act and
any right of replay so obtained shall not
represent a valuable thing within the meaning
of this Act.3'
The effect was to open the door much wider;
gambling machines equipped with the free-game-
payoff subterfuge otherwise fitted the above
description, and of course they did not return to
the player any "coins, tokens or merchandise.
' '2
If the legislature was confused about what it had
48, and where the free-game-payoff subterfuge is ac-
curately identified and proscribed, e.g., Hunter v.
Mayr, etc., of Teaneck Twp., 128 N.J.L. 164, 24 A.
2d 553 (1942), In re Sutton, 148 Pa. Super. 101, 24 A.
2d 756 (1942), People v Gravenhorst, 32 N. Y. S.
2d 760 (1942) and cases collected in note 9 supra.
30 Simon, The Illinois Legislature: A Study in Cor-
ruption, Harper's, September, 1964, p. 73, 78.31 Laws, 1953, p. 929, §1.
n In Kentucky a strikingly similar amendment ("if
such device itself does not pay off in money, tokens or
merchandise or other prizes"), passed by the Kentucky
legislature in 1950 [Laws, 1950, c. 145, K.R.S. §436.230
(5)] has just been replaced by a new statute (G.A.
Reg. Sess., 1966, S.B. 104) sponsored by Governor
Breathitt to end pinball gambling in that state, and
which distinguishes between gambling devices and
amusement games with exemplary clarity. This action
evoked a congratulatory telegram from Attorney Gen-
eral Katzenbach (Feb. 16, 1966): "This kind of action
which can interlock so closely with Federal legislation
represents vividly the way state and Federal authori-
ties can and must work hand in hand against gam-
bling and organized crime." The Kentucky law will,
hopefully, provide a fine model for other jurisdictions.
given, the gamblers had no doubt about what they
got. Illinois reopened as a prime market for
"bingo" machines, and in a 1957 test case the
Supreme Court of Illinois-without attention to
other obvious gambling features-affirmed that
the then-current gambling prototype was legal.
People v. One Mechanical Device, 11 Ill. 2d 151,
142 N. E. 2d 98 3 In a subsequent test case, People
v. Twelve Pinball Machines, Stephenson Co. No.
59-160, decided Jan. 11, 1960, the state adduced
full proof of the gambling features of the "bingo"
machines, and the court responded by condemning
the machines and distinguishing the One Mechan-
ical Device case.1 But the gambling proprietors
allowed their dozen machines to be destroyed
rather than risk an appeal, and thus this test was
aborted.35
Meanwhile, efforts to tighten the statute were
also being made in the General Assembly. In the
1959 session, following demonstrations of the two
types of machines and their differing charac-
teristics in both Houses,36 a bill7 was passed
which would have outlawed gambling pinballs
while still permitting the bona fide amusement
varieties. Though the legislative action was by
almost unanimity,u and no one in Springfield
could have misunderstood what was at stake,39
Governor Stratton killed the bill in a surprise
veto, explaining:
"This Bill would distinguish between coin-
operated amusement devices as to the manner
3 Justices Davis, Schaefer and Hershey dissenting,
142 N. E. 2d 98, 101.
34The opinion in the Stephenson County cases is set
forth in the Brief of The Chicago Crime Commission as
Amicus Curiae, pp. la-9a, White v. Ogilvie, 51 Il.
App. 2d 181, 201 N. E. 2d 122 (First Dist., No. 49404,
1964) q.v.
31 Similarly, machines were sacrificed to avoid a
definitive result in the first I.R.S. test case after
Korpan (354 U. S. 271). U. S. v. Nine Gambling De-
vices, 59-2 USTC 15,257 (S. D. Ill., 1957).
16 When the measure was reached on the agenda of
the House Executive Committee the hearing was ren-
dered "unofficial" by the signalled withdrawal of
enough members to deplete the quorum. The maneuver
did not escape public notice, e.g., "Mystery Phone Call
Halts Pinball Hearing," Chicago Daily News, p. 1,
June 18, 1959; "Pinball Ban Blocked by Mystery Phone
Call," Chicago American, p. 1, June 18, 1959.
37 71st G. A., S. 700.
uIn the Senate, 49 to 3; in the House, 118 to 1. As
one editorial writer boldly ventured, "The opposition
did not melt away until a rumor that certain pinball
interests were -prepared to spend $50,000 to defeat the
bill gained wide circulation in the state capital. Perhaps
out of fear that they would be publicly linked with a
suspected payoff, the foes of the measure gave up. ...
Chicago Sun Times, Aug. 7, 1959.
19 Cf., e.g., notes 36 and 38 supra.
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in which a replay is permitted, classifying one
group as gambling devices and the other not.
...The objects sought by this Bill can...
be fully accomplished by local authorities
Without arbitrarily giving preference to one
type of amusement device and banning a
similar type.
40
In the 1961 session a similar bill 41 passed the
Senate, again by near unanimity,42 but was
scuttled in the House in an amendment maneuver
'in the closing, hours of a hectic session. 3
The 1961 session did, nonetheless, manage to
enact a revision of the Illinois Criminal Code in
toto, including a revised version of the 1895 Act,
so that the applicable portions read (with the
1953 pinball amendment, also slightly revised)
as follows:'
§28-1. Gambling. [a], A person commits
gambling when he:
(3) Operates, keeps, owns, uses, pur-
chases, exhibits, rents, sells, bargains
for the sale or lease of, 'manufactures or
distributes any gaming device; or...
[b] Participants in any
of the following activities shall not be con-
victed of gambling:
(1) Agreements to... etc.
§28-2. Definitions. [a] A "gambling de-
vice" is any clock, tape machine, slot machine
or other machine or device for the reception
of money or other thing of value on chance
or skill or upon the action of which money or
other thing of value is staked, hazarded, bet,
won or lost; or... A "gambling device"
does not include:
(1) A coin-in-the-slot-operated mechani-
cal device played for amusement
which rewards the player with the right
to replay such mechanical device, which
device is so constructed or devised as to
make such result of the operation thereof
40 Chicago Tribune, July 25, 1959.
4172d G. A., S. 137, S. 138.
42 33 to 2.43 Chicago Sun Times, June 27, 1961. Also: "The
most concentrated deluge of mail within the memory
of Illinois legislators, urging defeat of antipinball bills,
is swamping the House post office. What most legis-
lators don't know is that the manufacturer who stands
to suffer from the legislation also has 'manufactured'
most of the mail . . ." Chicago Daily News, June 2,
1961.
44 Laws, 1961, pp. 1983, 2033-5.
depend in part upon the skill of the
player and which returns to the player
thereof no coins, tokens, or merchandise.
[Emphasis added.]
These revisions took effect January 1, 1962.
Though the new Code specifically added a pro-
hibition against "manufacture," this induced no
hasty action against gambling manufacturers in
the Cook County States Attorney's office;45 but
early in 1963 Chicago city police made a seizure
(of slot machines)-only to be castigated, and
have the seizure voided, because no one had taken
the precaution of dissolving the injunctions left
over from the Hershey case.
46
In this period a major change occurred in the
federal pattern, affecting what was to happen next
in the 1963 session of the Illinois General Assembly.
The federal Johnson Act,0 enacted in 1951 to
prohibit the interstate transportation of coin-
operated gambling devices, contained exactly the
same loophole for free-game-payout-subterfuge
pinball games as the Illinois law. The Johnson Act
language was "deliver, as the result of the appli-
cation of an element of chance, any money or
property." (Obviously, machines which control
payouts by means of free games do not deliver
anything directly). This was corrected, in the
federal Gaming Devices Act of 1962, enacted
October 18, 1962,4 to read, "by the operation of
which a person may become entitled to receive,
as the result of the application of an element of
chance, any money or property." The new lan-
guage was aimed expressly at the gambling-type
pinball machine,49 and has been subsequently so
interpreted and applied.
51
The federal act made another significant clari-
fication in 1962. The manufacture of machines
destined for foreign jurisdictions or domestic
jurisdictions where such machines are lawful,
though requiring registration, was excluded from
the general prohibitions of the federal law.51
Accordingly, when the 1963 session of the Illi-
41 Which had earlier been goaded into action-but
not much action-after a man caught tampering with a
gambling pinball machine was turned over by local
police to three hoodlums who almost beat him to death,
e.g., "Survey Reveals Pinball Machines Flourish in
Suburbs," Chicago American, p. 1, Sept. 17, 1961.
46 Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 10, 1963; Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 18, 1963.47 Act of Jan. 2, 1951, 64 Stat. 1134, 15 U.S.C.
§§1171 ff. See, King, supra, note 3, at 204-6.
41 P. L. 87-840, 76 Stat. 1075, 15 U.S.C. §§1171 ff.
49 See H. Rep. No. 1828, supra, note 7.
10 U. S. v. Two Coin Operated Pinball Machines,
241 F. Supp. 57 (W. D. Ky., 1964).
5' 15 U.S.C. §§1171(d), 1172, 1173(a)(1)-(3).
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nois General Assembly opened, with the new
federal precedents, the confusion surrounding the
status of manufacturers, and the structure of the
newly-revised Ilinois Code to preserve, the bill
introduced again to curb gambling pinballs took a
form slightly different from its predecessors. It
merely substituted for the words "coins, tokens,
or merchandise" (italicized in the quotation of the
Illinois statute above) the words "money, prop-
erty, or right to receive money or property,"
and in its final version it added an exemption in
§28-1(b) supra, as follows:
(4) Manufacture of gambling devices, includ-
ing the acquisition of essential parts therefor
and the assembly thereof, for transportation
in interstate or foreign commerce to any
place outside this State when such transpor-
tation is not prohibited by any applicable
Federal law.
Once again the measure 2 passed both Houses
with near-unanimity (though it was almost de-
railed by a surprise attack from the Cook County
States Attorney, who denounced it publicly at
the crucial last moment as "a legal paradox"
and warned that it "could lead to wide-open
gambling in Illinois");O and this time Governor
Kerner signed it. The enacting signature was af-
fixed July 9, 1963, and the measure was widely
hailed as liberating Illinois at last from the gam-
bling pinball operators and crimping the profits of
"the syndicate."
But this was not the last word. On July 11-two
days later-the Cook County Sheriff's Police made
a spectacular raid on 67 premises, rounding up
pinball machines by the truckload. 5  On July 24,
in an action brought by one owner operating one
machine in one location known as Ella's Grill,
the Sheriff and his men were enjoined by a Su-
perior Court judge. Ella had sworn that she knew
of no pay-offs on this machine while it was in her
grill.'Y The owner insisted that the $250 federal
52 73rd G. A., H. 374 (with 27 sponsors) and S. 388
(with 4 sponsors).
13 Chicago American, June 12, 1963. The vote in tho
Senate was 45 to 3; in the House there were no "nays."
See note 38 supra.
"Chicago American, July 9, 1963 (editorial, July
10, 1963); Chicago Tribune, July 10, 1963; Chicago
Daily News (editorial) July 11, 1963; Chicago Sun-
Times (editorial) July 11, 1963.
" Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1963; Chicago Sun-
Times, July 12, 1963.
"Though the operator admitted that in Ella's
modest 10-stool establishment this one machine pro-
duced profits of over $4000 per year--an average of
$11.00 per day from patrons who purportedly played
it for amusement! See, Brief of Chicago Crime Commis-
gaming device stamp obtained.for the machine was
irrelevant because he had purchased it .under pro-
test. Holding that the new amendment did not
reach gambling-type pinball niachines, the judge
was quoted as saying to, the prosecutor:..
"I don't know how anyone could read that
into the bill. If the legislature had wanted to
pass a law as you interpret it, ,they would have
put it in plain language. We must take the
statute as it is. We cannot add or subtract."57
Immediately following this order, leave was
given Ella's attorney to join-i.e, to bring within
the injunction-all other owners who had been
affected by the seizure, some 50 additional par-
ties operating 70 machines in other -locations.
But though extensive testimony was taken sub-
sequently before a master,2 none of these late-
comers were ever examined to see what they might
say about their operations.
The seized machines were returned, and gam-
bling conditions in the County quickly returned to
normalcy.0 The State's Attorney appealed (onthe
record confined to the unconttadicted testimony
of Ella and her cohorts). Dealing with theprin-
cipal issue, whether "[returns a] right to money or
property" in the Illinois amendment was intended
to mean the same thing as "become entitled to
receiv... money or property" in the federal
version, the State's brief offered this edifying ar-
gument:
"As a further corollary to the interpretation
of the 1963 amendment, it is necessary to de-
fine and analyze the literal connotation of.the
term right. Contrary to the common mis-
conception concerning that term, it is quite
evident that the word right is one of the most
ambiguous words in all of legal jurisprudence
(Pound, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 56, 57).
The broad and normal meaning of this word
in its true sense, is a manifestation of a reason-
able expectation involved in civilized life; a
capacity of creating rather than an absolute
creation or interest (Pound, Jurisprii4ence,
Vol. 2, p. 56-57)."10
sion As Amicus Curiae, supra, note 34, pp. 5- Cf.,
note 6 supra.
57 Chicago Tribune, July 25, 1963.,
"s Chicago American, Sept. 13, 1963
"9 For fiscal 1964 the Chicago I.R:8. 'office issued
178 federal gambling device tax stamps. I.R.S. records,
showing the name and address of, each $250 stamp-tax
applicant, are available to "any prosecuting. officer of
any State, county, or municipality" by" 'specific direc-
tion of Congress. I.R.C., 1954 (26 U.S.C.) §6107, See,
note 15 supra.
60 Brief of Defendant-Appellant in White v. Ogilvie
note 34, supra, (p. 24). In the West edition of Pound
1966], :
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That the scholarly legacy of the great Dean (whose
eternal rest must have been troubled by the re-
dundancy of "legal jurisprudence" thus falsely
attributed to him) might someday help enfran-
chise pinball gamblers in Illinois he doubtless
never foresaw. But the State lost its appeal on
this ground.6 White v. Ogilvie, 51 Ill. App. 2d 181,
201 N. E. 2d 122 (1964).
Mr. Justice Sullivan, for a unanimous Appellate
Division bench, first observed:
Testimony was elicited from plaintiffs' wit-
nesses showing that the machines were used
only for amusement purposes. This testimony
stands uncontradicted. No evidence was
presented by the defendant to the effect
that such machines were ever used for gam-
bling purposes or that anything was ever




The Illinois act requires that a machine meet-
ing all the other requirements of the excep-
tion to the statutory definition of a "gambling
device" be one which returns to the player
thereof no money or property or right to re-
ceive money or property. In order to remove it
from the exception, the device must actually
"return" money or property or the right
thereto. It is not sufficient that the machine
may be used to return the right to money
or property. Assuming, arguendo, that a
gambling debt was collectible in this state, a
person playing one of these machines could
not bring an action to collect anything for
(1959), in Volume IV at p. 56, a general philosophical
discussion of "a right" is commenced as follows:
"Meaning of the term 'a right.' There is no more
ambiguous word in legal and juristic literature
than the word right. In its most general sense it
means a reasonable expectation involved in
civilized life. As a noun, it has been used in five
senses in the law books .... "
The treatise then qualifies and clarifies this introduc-
tion in some thirty-five pages of Hohfeldian erudition
including, at p. 57 (also in Volume IV) the following:
"(3) A third use is to designate a capacity of
creating, divesting or altering rights in the second
sense and so of creating or altering duties. Here
the proper term is 'power.' "
61 Ella's counsel, whose breeziness makes my tone in
these pages sound like stuffy paraphrasing of the King
James Version, rejoined, "If the Legislature did intend
such an interpretation, then it should also change
'The Bill of Rights' to 'The Bill of Manifestations of
reasonable expectations involved in Civilized life.' "
Brief and Argument for Plaintifis-Appellees in White v.
Ogilvie, note 34, supra at 28.
62 51 Ill. App. 2d 181, 184-5.
replays he might have won. The machine
itself gives the player the "right" to receive
only replays. If the legislature wished to
achieve the same results that the courts have
held result from the language of the Federal
Gaming Devices Act, they would have
couched the 1963 amendment in language
of similar import 3 [Emphasis in original].
For what comfort it might be, the court acknowl-
edged, "We have no doubt that machines of this
type can be used for gambling purposes, and con-
sidering the construction of the machine it becomes
obvious that the manufacturers had this in mind,
as well as a use for amusement solely. However
... the fact that they are also specially adaptable
to use as gambling devices is irrelevant in the
absence of any evidence proving such use."6' In
other words, the 1963 amendment was construed
to be an absolute nullity,6 5 and law enforcement
officers were back where they started under the
1895 Act-able (and, it might also be noted,
obliged) to seize a machine only if they actually
happened to see a pay-off being made on it.66
During this same period, pinball gambling
operations had been seriously threatened by a
rule of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission
providing that purchase of a $250 Federal Gaming
Device Stamp for a licensed premises would be
grounds for suspension or revocation. This rule
was promptly challenged, and early in 1964 the
Supreme Court of Illinois held it invalid, on the
ground that (making no reference to the 1963
amendment of §28-2), ".... it is the view in this
jurisdiction that a pinball machine is not a gaming
device per se since its use may be solely for en-
tertainment purposes" and that the Commission
was apparently drawing an irrebuttable presump-
tion from purchase of such a stamp, instead of a
rebuttable one.6 Shoot v. Illinois Liquor Control
63Id. at 191.
6Id. at 188.
65 Cf., Scofield v. Board of Education, 411 Ill. 11,
103 N. E. 2d 640 (1952); People ex rel. Serbin v.
Calderwoud, 33 Ill. App. 541, 77 N. E. 2d 849 (1948).
66 Sheriff's police seized 9 machines on this basis in
Cook County in August, 1964. Chicago Sun-Times,
Aug. 9, 1964. This was followed by an I.R.S. raid in
which Treasury agents seized 41 more which they
found operating without the current $250 federal
gaming device stamp. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 20,
1964; Chicago Tribune, Aug. 20, 1964.
67 The Bilek-Ganz proposals ignore both the federal
gaming-device stamp tax and the vulnerability of
licensed premises to lose anything more than their
right to keep pinball machines (for one year). Bilek
and Ganz, note 1, supra at 444-5. The $250 federal
stamp must already be registered with local authori-
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Commission, 30 Ill. 2d 570, 198 N. E. 2d 497
(1964)." The Appellate Court in White v. Ogilvie
relied heavily on the text of Shoot to buttress its
conclusion that the 1963 amendment had no
prohibitory effects.6"
The Supreme Court of Illinois denied review
of White v. Ogilvie on Sept. 11, 1964.70 So the pin-
ball gamblers were once more operating in the
clear (and always in the black-revenues from
these machines in Cook County alone, conserva-
tively estimated from the number publicly listed
as operating there at this writing, run in the range
of S175,000 per month).
But the action now shifts to a new quarter. In
the fall of 1964, with an eye on the forthcoming
1965 legislative session, the Mayor of Chicago (in
whose urban jurisdiction all pinballs have been
banned since 1931)7 announced the formation of a
blue-ribbon committee of public officials and
civic leaders to work up a set of new anti-crime
measures "designed to make a criminal's life in
Illinois a little more miserable." 2 Early in Decem-
ber, 1964, this committee approved work on four-
teen draft bills, covering everything from wire-
tapping to Molotov cocktails; and one of the four-
teen was a revision of §28-2, in yet another at-
tempt to reach the gambling pinballs.
The draftsmen assigned to this pinball bill were
skillful lawyers, and what they produced was a
rewording which would have made the applicable
provisions of §28-2 read as follows:
Sec. 28-2. Definitions. (a) A "gambling de-
vice" is any clock, tape machine, slot machine
or other machines or device for the reception
of money or other thing of value on chance
or skill or upon the action of which money
or other thing of value is staked, hazarded,
bet, won or lost; any other machine or mechan-
ical device designed and manufactured pri-
marily for use in connection with gambling,
ties [Ch. 38, §28-4, IU. Rev. Stat. (1963) as amended
by 74th G. A., H.B. 280 (1965)]; and tying it effectively
to tavern licenses, etc.-which might even be done by
a mere revision of the presumption in the Liquor Com-
mission's rule-would be a long step. See, Gaynor,
Indirect Control of Organized Crime Through Liquor
License Procedure, 49 J. CRM. L., C. & P. S. 65 (1958).
Is Justice Schaefer dissenting, 30 Ill. 2d 570, 578,
198 N. E. 2d 497, 501.
6 50 Ill. App. 2d 181, 186-8.
70 30 Ill. 2d 628.71 See, Silfen v. Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 117, 19 N. E.
2d 640 (1939); Berman v. Prendergast, 338 Il. App.
580, 88 N. E. 2d 374 (1949); Kitt v. Chicago, 415 Ill.
246, 112 N. E. 2d 607 (1953).
72 Chicago American, Nov. 27, 1964.
and (A) which when operated may deliver,
as the result of the application of an element
of chance, any money or property, or (B) by
the operation of which a person may become
entitled to receive, as the result of the applica-
tion of an element of chance, any money or prop-
erty; or any mechanism, furniture, fixture,
equipment or other device designed primarily
for use in a gambling place. A "gambling
device" does not include:
(1) A coin in the slot operated mechanical
device designed and manufactured to be
played for amusement only, which may
through the application of an element of
skill reward the player with the right to
replay such mechanical device at no addi-
tional cost, and provided that such mechan-
ical device can accumulate no more than 15
free replays at one time, can be discharged
of accumulated free replays only by reac-
tivating the device for one additional play
for each accumulated jree replay, and
makes no permanent record directly or in-
directly of free replays so awarded. Not-
withstanding any other provision of this
subsection, any mechanical device classified
by the United States as requiring a Federal
Gaming Device Tax Stamp under the
applicable provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code shall be excluded from the excep-
tion contained in this subsection. [Em-
phasis added.]
This language could scarcely have failed to hit the
target, for it picked up the wording of the federal
Gaming Devices Act verbatim (as the Court had
recommended in White v. Ogilvie), added limi-
tations directly upon the numbers of free replays
allowed and how they could be cancelled, 73 and-
as an extra precaution-tied the definition to the
federal stamp tax.
But though the Mayor's other proposals were
approved by his committee, sent to Springfield
early in the 1965 session, and quickly started on
their way through the legislative processes, the
pinball draft never left Chicago. The Sheriff of
Cook County (member ex-officio of the Mayor's
committee) knocked it out of the package by
insisting that he wanted to submit a measure of
his own and needed time to study the situation
before doing so.
And presto! Three months later, dated March
73 See, note 22 supra.
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28, 1965, the proposals which are the subject of
the instant Journal article by Messrs. Bilek and
Ganz made. their appearance, then entitled "Pro-
posed Legislation Concerning Pinball Machines"
and presented as having" been prepared for the
Sheriff by the authors on behalf of the Cook
County Sheriff's Police Department.
The biennial session of each General Assembly
must conclude its business and adjourn finally
not later than midnight on June 30 of each session
year. Therefore it is small wonder that the Sheriff's
proposal-the three thousand word version-was
transmitted like lightning to Springfield, and was
introduced in the House on June 9, 1965. 74 With
it were three companion bills which, among other
things, quietly took the whole subject out of the
Illinois Criminal Code 5 and deprived all county
and municipal jurisdictions of any further power
to regulate pinball machines
6
Even so, the anti-gambling forces nearly won.
On June 27, 1965, one of the companion billsP
was amended by unanimous House action and
sent to the Senate incorporating exactly the
Mayor's version of the amendments to §28-2, as
set forth above. What followed was a cliff-hanger:
the Sheriff's other bills were tabled and the
Mayor's good version was shunted around on the
74 74th G. A., H.B. 2197.
75 74th G. A., H.B. 2200.
76 74th G. A., H.B. 2198, H.B. 2199.
7 H.B. 2200.
Senate calendar until five hours after the'constitu-
tional adjournment deadline. Then, at 7 a.m. on
July 1, with the clock stopped and everyone slip-
ping out to head for home, the bill fell victim of
an impassioned plea from a spokesman for the
Cook County delegation in the Senate. He ex-
plained to an emptying chamber that once again
some "bad" pinball manufacturers were trying to
hoodwink the Legislature into giving them an un-
warranted advantage by outlawing the games of
one misunderstood company whose products were
amusement devices like all the rest-only perhaps
a little more "sophisticated." On the tally, seven-
teen votes were recorded; nine senators were on
hand to vote against the bilP8 and (of a total mem-
bership of fifty-eight) eight remained on hand to
vote for it.
How could the Illinois "pinball problem" be
solved? What would liberate the people of this
great state from its gambling promoters? A sure-
appearing solution would be enactment of the
statutory text propounded by Mayor Daley-i.e.,
H. B. 2200 as it is set forth supra and as it nearly
passed the 74th General Assembly.
But that cannot be undertaken until 1967. And
if history does indeed tend to repeat itself, the
odds on it are not perhaps the best of gambler's
odds.
78 Seven from Cook County.
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